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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUBPART F OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
RICHARD J. HoRwicH*
I. INTRODUCTION
For the more than five decades of corporate income taxation prior
to 1961, corporations organized abroad were generally not subject to
United States income tax on foreign income, even if they were con-
trolled by United States residents.' When the administration proposed
in early 1961 to reach the foreign income of many controlled foreign
corporations by taxing the stockholders currently, a good deal of con-
sideration was given to the question of whether or not such taxation would
violate the United States Constitution. Without deciding the propriety
of Congress concerning itself about constitutionality,2 it is necessary for
the tax bar to evaluate the validity of the legislation finally enacted in
1962. This discussion relates to subpart F,1 the matter of controlled
corporations; other aspects of the taxation of foreign income by The
Revenue Act of 1962, although possibly raising constitutional questions,
are outside the scope of this article.4
II. THE EVOLVING PROPOSAL
Subpart F did not reach enactment in a smooth or customary
manner. There have been many changes between the first gleam in Pro-
fessor Surrey's eye and the most recent regulations approved by Assistant
Secretary Surrey. It is one thesis of this article that the applicability of
certain rules of constitutional law has varied with these changes, so that
a particularly cogent argument, pro or con, at one stage of the proposal
may miss the target when addressed to a later version.
In 1956, Professor Surrey, although encouraging the study of tax
deferral for domestic corporations with all income from foreign sources,
* Partner, Pallot, Marks, Lundeen, Poppell & Horwich, Miami, Florida; Lecturer in
Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Tariff of 1909, § 38, 36 Stat. 113 (1909) ; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 881(a), 882(b).
Foreign personal holding companies, a limited exception, are discussed later.
2. See PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 211 (1947).
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 951-64. Subpart G, sections 970-72, deals with export trade
corporations, an exception to subpart F.
4. Some of the areas in which constitutional problems have been suggested but which
are not considered in this article are these:
The grossing-up provisions of §§ 902 and 78, taxing to the domestic parent the amount
of foreign taxes paid by a foreign subsidiary.
The treatment of some proceeds of a sale or exchange of stock of a controlled foreign
corporation as a dividend under § 1248.
The current taxation of the income of non-electing foreign investment companies to
their stockholders under §§ 1246 and 1247.
The extent to which Congress has delegated rule-making power to the Secretary of the
Treasury under the various foreign income provisions of The Revenue Act of 1962.
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mentioned in passing the possibility of taxing foreign subsidiaries cur-
rently; he referred to either taxation of the exercise in the United States
of control and management of a foreign corporation or taxation of owner-
ship of the stock of a foreign corporation.' For a few years, the trend of
critical thinking was in favor of more liberal treatment of foreign income
of corporations, particularly along the lines of benefits for domestic
corporations.6 But one writer concluded a discussion of the Boggs Bill,
an unadopted attempt to benefit domestic corporations receiving foreign
income, with these prophetic words:
Perhaps the most significant effect it has had is to stimulate
some embryonic new thinking about our taxation of foreign
income-thinking which moves in the opposite direction from
the liberalization which Representative Boggs intended.7
Indeed, despite suggestions that taxation should not be used to
attempt to control foreign investment,' the administration proceeded in
early 1961 to seek a major change in the taxation of foreign corporations.
The proposal was to tax earnings of foreign corporations to United States
stockholders currently unless the foreign corporations were organized in
less developed countries; tax on the latter corporations would remain
deferred unless they were tax haven corporations, i.e., corporations
deriving more than 20 per cent of their income from outside the country
of organization.'
Now the path became irregular. 10 After extensive hearings, the Ways
and Means Committee could not report a bill and asked the Treasury
Department to draft one, preserving deferral except for tax haven corpo-
rations. A draft bill by the Treasury Department was released July 28,
1961 and revised thereafter. The Ways and Means Committee resumed
hearings in 1962 and H.R. 10650 was reported out and passed by the
House on March 29, 1962; the Committee compromised its original
request by permitting deferral by non-tax haven corporations which
reinvested their earnings in their businesses. After more extensive hear-
ings before the Senate Finance Committee in April and May, that Com-
5. Surrey, Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment, 56 CoLUx.
L. REv. 815, 826-27 (1956).
6. E.g., Lidstone, Double Taxation of Foreign Income? Or an Adventure in International
Double Talk? 44 VA. L. REv. 921 (1958).
7. Tillinghast, Taxation of Foreign Investment: A Critique of the Boggs Bill, 16 TAX
L. REV. 81, 118 (1960).
8. Anthoine & Bloch, Tax Policy and the Gold Problem: An Agenda for Inquiry, 61
COLum. L. REv. 322 (1961); Surrey, The United States Taxation of Foreign Income, 1 J.
LAW. & EcoN. 72 (1958).
9. U.S. TREAs. DFP'x PRESIDENT'S TAX PROGRAx-OFFICAL EXPLANATION 11-15 (1961),
in Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Committee on the President's 1961 Tax
Recommendations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 253 (1961).
10. See generally Stone, Taxation on Private Investments Abroad-Legal Aspects (Part
1), 4 Sw. L. FN. INST. ON PRiV. INV. ABROAD 195 (1962).
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mittee also asked for a new draft by the Treasury Department, which
was forthcoming May 31, 1962; this draft incorporated major changes:
(a) Foreign manufacturing subsidiaries were not reached,
unless they loaned or otherwise repatriated assets to the United
States; reinvestment of earnings in the business was no longer
relevant.
(b) Intangible industrial rights, e.g., patents, were taxed
at transfer rather than classifying compensation for use of them
as tax haven income.
(c) Service income was included as tax haven income.
(d) The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to per-
mit deferral upon finding no purpose of tax reduction.
(e) Deferral for investment increase in less developed
countries was limited to investment income derived from less
developed countries.
There were additional hearings, but a more regular course followed.
The Finance Committee Report," essentially the final act, raised the
floor on significant tax haven income to 30 per cent of gross income,
permitted individual United States shareholders to elect corporate rates
in certain instances, and added two more escape valves (or loopholes):
(a) Exemption from the legislation if a sufficient portion
of the earnings of the foreign subsidiary is distributed, depend-
ing on the foreign tax rate.
(b) Exemption for export trade corporations.
Since subpart F became law on October 16, 1962, the Treasury
Department has issued proposed and final regulations of impressive
length and complexity 2 and the subpart F regulations probably are
now substantially complete.' They hold little significance for consti-
tutional issues, except, perhaps, for the firm attitude toward indirect
control of foreign corporations 14 and the rather startlingly detailed rules
11. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 1962-3 Cum. BuLL. 785-86. Of major
significance, the Senate also deleted the proposed additions to § 482.
12. This may fuel the fires under the last constitutional issue listed in note 4 supra, re-
lating to the extent of authority delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury.
13. In September of 1964, Assistant Secretary Surrey advised that all regulations under
the 1962 subpart F provisions would be published by the end of 1964. Surrey, The United
States Tax System and International Tax Relationships, 43 TAXES 6, 26 (1965). At least one
substantial exception was T.D. 6795 published January 29, 1965. 30 Fed. Reg. 933 (regula-
tions under § 951 and amendments of other subpart F regulations).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b),(c) (1963). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.951-1(e)(2),(3),(4) and
(g) (2) (1965) (determination of prorata share of subpart F income and of voting power,
when there is more than one class of stock). The final regulations under § 957 are even
stricter than the proposed regulations. Friedman & Silbert, Final Regulations on Controlled
Foreign Corporations and Less Developed Country Corporations, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED.
TAx 811, 813-823 (1964); Hughes, First Foreign Income Regulations Are Adopted; Do They
Exceed the Intent of the Statute?, 20 J. TAxATION 24 (1964).
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established to determine the destination of sales, location of production,
and place of performance of services. 5
One way to measure the impact of subpart F is to review the tax
avoidance proposals of tax planners:
1. Decontrol of foreign corporations.
2. Combining foreign businesses so that over 70 per cent
of the gross income of the foreign corporation is non-tainted:
from manufacturing, trading with unrelated parties, trading or
rendering services in the country of organization.
3. Use of export trade corporations.
4. Securing Treasury approval because actual foreign
taxes are at least 90 per cent of taxes avoided, showing no pur-
pose of tax reduction.
5. Wise use of foreign tax credit.
6. Minimum adequate distributions of earnings.
7. Use of Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations and
possessions corporations.
8. Investments in less developed countries by tax haven
corporations.
9. Election of individual to use corporate rates.
10. Avoiding repatriation of earnings when taxation is
otherwise deferred. 16
III. THE TAXING POWER
The Constitution does grant the power "to lay and collect taxes,' 7
but another provision requires that "direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States" according to their respective populations. 8
When the Supreme Court held an 1896 income tax unconstitutional
because a tax on income from property was considered a direct tax on
property, 9 the Constitution was modified by addition of the sixteenth
amendment:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3, 4 (1964).
16. Hoefs & Bunge, How to Minimize the Tax Impact on Foreign Operations under the
1962 Act, 19 J. TAXATiON 346 (1963). Wender similarly discusses several of the methods and
concludes that no single method is best to minimize United States tax in all cases. Wender,
Tax Planning for International Operations Under the Revenue Act of 1962-A Case Study,
41 TAXES 835, 848-57 (1963).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. (1).
18. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. (3).
19. Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
1965]
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among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.20
Between the inception of the amendatory process and the final
certification of ratification, the Supreme Court upheld a tax on corporate
income as an excise tax on doing business as a corporation.2' Conse-
quently, there has been a corporate income tax continuously, and the
Court has not dealt with a system which does not tax corporations
separately.22 So the accurate argument that the Court generally recog-
nizes the separate existence of corporations for tax and other purposes"8
does not indicate that the Court would object on constitutional grounds
to ignoring the corporation in taxing income. 4
However, the language of the Court in Eisner v. Macomber25 goes
beyond merely recognizing the separate existence of corporations. In
that case the Court held that a stock dividend not changing the propor-
tionate interests of shareholders is not taxable, neither as a valuable thing
received nor as evidence of an increase in the stockholder's undistributed
share of the corporate net worth. The Court addressed itself to the latter
basis in these words:
That Congress has power to tax shareholders upon their prop-
erty interests in the stock of corporations is beyond question;
and that such interests might be valued in view of the condition
of the company, including its accumulated and undivided
profits, is equally clear. But that this would be taxation of
property because of ownership, and hence would require appor-
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
21. Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
22. The trend among the nations of the world is to tax corporate income separately.
U.N. Ecosoc. 'COMPARATIVE APPROACH To NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAX
PROBLEMS, Fiscal Comm., 3d Sess. 30-33 (E/CN 8/55) (1951).
23. Hearings on the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations, supra note 9, at 311-12.
24. In Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 (1938), the Court upheld the
special corporate tax on unreasonably accumulated earnings. The following passage seems
worth noting on this point:
It is said that the statute is unconstitutional because the liability imposed is not a
tax upon income, but a penalty designed to force corporations to distribute earnings
in order to create a basis for taxation against the stockholders. If the business had
been carried on by Kohl individually all the year's profits would have been taxable
to him. If, having a partner, the business had been carried on as a partnership, all
the year's profits would have been taxable to the partners, although these had been
retained by the partnership undistributed .... Kohl, the sole owner oj the business,
could not by conducting it as a corporation, prevent Congress, if it chose to do so,
from laying on him individually the tax on the year's profits. If it preferred, Con-
gress could lay the tax upon the corporation, as was done ... 2" 304 U.S. at 288.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The footnote to the emphasized dictum gives authorities which fall roughly into three groups:
(1) cases upholding the taxation to parent corporations of pre-1913 earnings distributed by
wholly-owned subsidiaries; (2) foreign personal holding company provisions, and (3) the
various acts taxing unreasonably accumulated earnings, some levied on the stockholders and
some on the corporations. In the last connection, although the pre-1920 taxes were all against
shareholders and the post-1920 taxes all against the corporations, no mention is made of the
1920 decision of the Court in Eisner v. Macomber, discussed infra in the text.
25. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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tionment under the provisions of the Constitution, is settled
beyond peradventure by previous decisions of this court ...
Manifestly this argument must be rejected, since the Amend-
ment applies to income only, and what is called the stock-
holder's share in the accumulated profits of the company is
capital, not income. As we have pointed out, a stockholder has
no individual share in accumulated profits, nor in any particular
part of the assets of the corporation, prior to dividend de-
clared.2 6 (Emphasis supplied.)
Earlier in its opinion, the Court discussed at length the distinction
between capital and income under the constitutional amendment and
defined income as something "proceeding from the property, severed from
the capital.12 7 It is upon that distinction, and upon its application to the
taxation of shareholders on increases in undistributed net worth, both
as stated in Eisner v. Macomber, that most doubts of the constitution-
ality of subpart F are predicated.28
By the same token, proponents of constitutionality cast their doubts
upon the decision in Eisner v. Macomber itself: 29 The decision was five
to four, with two strong dissenting opinions by Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, and the dissents went to the issues pertinent to subpart F.
Later, in Helvering v. Bruun,80 the Court held that the value added to
land by buildings erected by a lessee could be taxed as income to the
lessor in the year in which he repossesses his land; the Court indicated
that Eisner v. Macomber retained validity only to distinguish ordinary
dividends from stock dividends.3
On the other hand, one may rush to the aid of Eisner v. Macomber
with mention of the refusal of the Court to overrule it in Helvering v.
Griffiths,82 a five to four decision rendered two years after Helvering v.
Bruun. And much more recently the Court, in the process of rejecting
Eisner v. Macomber as determinative of all gross income questions,
nevertheless described the case as useful in "distinguishing gain from
capital.""8 Even the broadest language in Helvering v. Bruun appears to
contain some limitation on realization of income:
While it is true that economic gain is not always taxable
as income, it is settled that the realization of gain need not be
26. Id. at 217, 219.
27. Id. at 207.
28. E.g., Hearings on the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations, supra note 9, at 312-
13; Dowdle, Can Domestic Shareholders Be Taxed on Foreign Corporate Earnings Prior to
Distribution?, 40 TAxEs 436 (1963).
29. E.g., Hearings on the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations, supra note 9, at 314-16.
30. 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
31. Id. at 468-9.
32. 318 U.S. 371 (1942).
33. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1955) (punitive dam-
ages recovered in antitrust suit held taxable).
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cash derived from the sale of an asset. Gain may occur as a
result of exchange of property, payment of the taxpayer's in-
debtedness, relief from a liability, or other profit realized from
the completion of a transaction."4 (Emphasis supplied.)
It seems fair to infer that a "transaction" is an essential ingredient
of realization. 5 The distinction between completion of a transaction
and passage of an annual accounting period is long-standing.8 Recog-
nizing these factors, as well as the possible vitality of Eisner v. Macom-
ber, one must conclude that the power to tax economic gain in this situa-
tion is surprisingly uncertain for a major change in the tax law.
87
IV. THE COMMERCE POWER
As H.R. 10650 went into Senate Finance Committee hearings, one
of the main purposes of the proposal was to make the immediate balance
of payments more favorable to the United States.88 It was, therefore,
argued convincingly that the power of Congress "to regulate commerce
with foreign nations" 9 was applicable and could be exercised by a tax
measure not subject to the constitutional limitations on pure revenue
measures.
40
At that stage, it seemed that the legislation would not run afoul
of the only relevant limitation on the power to regulate foreign com-
merce, the need to use reasonable means substantially related to the
objective. 4' Then the Finance Committee, as previously mentioned,
excepted manufacturing income from the impact of the act, thus encour-
aging the export of manufacturing investment. Further, the admonition to
Congress to make legislative findings indicating use of the commerce
power42 was not heeded in the act itself" or in the Finance Committee
34. 309 U.S. at 469.
35. Cf. Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951), acq., 1951-1 Cum. BULL. 3, acq. withdrawn,
T.I.R. 248, Aug. 29, 1960 (lapse of restrictions on stock received as payment held not a
taxable event); Kempler, Non-Restricted Option Plans: Kuchman and Lehman Cases, 16
TAx L. REV. 339, 344-45 (1961).
36. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931). The regulations under
subpart F hew strictly to the concept of accounting periods. See Treas. Reg. § 1.964(b) (iv)
(1964) (computing profits "without regard to equalization over more than one accounting
period").
37. It is also argued that the taxing power may reach the American shareholder under
the doctrine of constructive receipt, in order to prevent tax avoidance. Hearings on 1961 Tax
Recommendations, supra note 9, at 314. Since this argument leans heavily on the similar
provisions taxing foreign personal holding companies, it is considered in regard to that
analogy, infra in the text. Tax avoidance problems may also affect due process limitations,
discussed infra in the text.
38. Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 10650, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
173-217 (1962).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. (3).
40. Hearings on the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations, supra note 9, at 318-21.
The cases there cited bear out the argument.
41. Id. at 321-22.
42. Id. at 322.
43. The title of The Revenue Act of 1962 comes no closer than "to eliminate certain
defects and irregularities"; there is no declaration of legislative intent. 76 Stat. 960 (1962).
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report." Thus a strong legal position has been undermined, to some
degree, by matters of fact and form; the evolution of the proposal has
been particularly telling in this area.
V. DUE PROCESS
The Court has held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment prevents a state from taxing a man on his wife's income;45
the federal government is, of course, subject to a similar due process
clause." In support of subpart F, it is pointed out that income may be
taxed to persons having the real control or enjoyment and to persons who
must be deemed to constructively receive income in order to prevent
tax avoidance.47 Applying these rules is more difficult than stating them.
Subpart F measures a United States taxpayer's income by his pro-
portionate share of the income of a foreign corporation if he owns as
little as ten per cent of its stock.48 There is not much problem with
wholly-owned subsidiaries; complexity and constitutional difficulties
increase with the attribution rules, minority investors, beneficiaries of
estates, and the like.
49
But, at least at the current stage of development of the constitutional
law of income tax, it is hard to distinguish the degree of tax avoidance
that will justify taxing the stockholder on undistributed corporate
profits from that which would justify measuring his tax by the corporate
income;50 in other words, if the power is there because of tax avoidance,
44. The declared purpose is to end tax haven abuses and deferral, both as to all of the
foreign income provisions generally, S. REP. No. 1881, supra note 11, at 708, and as to sub-
part F particularly. Id. at 784-85. On the other hand, the domestic investment credit was
expressly declared to be intended to aid in meeting the balance of payment problem. Id. at
707. At the Finance Committee hearings, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon had pointed out
that tax haven corporations repatriated to the United States only about one third as much
as their earnings (about 15%) as other controlled foreign corporations (about 45%). Hear-
ings on H.R. 10650, supra note 38, at 4314-15.
45. Hoeper v. Tax Commissioner, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
47. Hearings on the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations, supra note 9, at 318.
48. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 951(b). The original proposal to tax every United States
shareholder if over half the stock was owned by all United States shareholders may have
been modified to reduce constitutional objections. Cf. Glasmann, Taxation on Private Invest-
ments Abroad-Legal Aspects (Part 2), 4 Sw. L. FN. INST. ON PRIV. INV. ABROAD 213, 224-25
(1962).
49. E.g., Alexander, Controlled Foreign Corporations and Constructive Ownership, 18
TAx L. REv. 531, 569 (1963) ; Hearings on H.R. 10650, supra note 38, at 2356.
50. In Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), an irrebuttable presumption that gifts
made within two years of death were made in contemplation of death was held unconstitu-
tional since it resulted in including another man's property in the estate of the deceased
donor and including the value of that property as part of the value of the donor's estate.
Corporations and income taxes, however, may lead to more complicated situations. For
example, an actual distribution probably can be taxed to the shareholder without regard
to whether its source was corporate profit or not. HOLMES, FEDERAL TAxEs 789 (6th ed.
1925). If undistributed amounts can be deemed distributed, does Congress have similar dis-
cretion in classifying them? Can a stockholder be taxed on undistributed income no matter
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the limitation is not applicable. And, if stockholders can be so taxed,
there is need for broad attribution rules to prevent wholesale avoidance.5'
The question appears to be whether or not the ends of subpart F justify
the means; a popular method of seeking the answer is to examine the
analogy to the foreign personal holding company provisions.
VI. THE ANALOGY TO FOREIGN PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANIES
If at any time during a taxable year, United States citizens and
residents own, directly or indirectly, more than 50 per cent in value of
the stock of a foreign corporation, and at least 60 per cent of its gross
income (or 50 per cent in subsequent years) is passive (e.g., dividends,
interest, rent, royalties), the corporation is a foreign personal holding
company,52 and each United States taxpayer actually58 owning stock must
include in his gross income, as a dividend, his share of the otherwise
undistributed taxable income of the corporation.54 These provisions were
enacted in 1937 to stop flagrant tax avoidance which a special joint
congressional committee found in the use of "incorporated pocketbooks"
organized abroad. 5
Writers who discussed taxing United States ownership of foreign
subsidiaries had mentioned the foreign personal holding company provi-
sions as a template even prior to 1961.10 Certainly the basic pattern
of subpart F follows the same lines: classify the foreign corporation
according to income and stock ownership, direct and indirect, and, if it
fits within the undesirable class, tax the United States stockholders cur-
rently.57 Most important to this discussion, counsel for the Treasury
how small his holdings? As to the latter question, see Echt, The Constitution and the
Corporation and the Congress, 42 TAXES 775, 777 (1964).
51. See Alexander, supra note 49, at 570.
52. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 552.
53. The corporation is classified according to indirect, as well as direct, stock owner-
ship. INT. REV. CODE OP 1954, § 554, but only actual stockholdings attract tax on the un-
distributed corporate income. The difference can lead to strange results. Alexander, Foreign
Personal Holding Companies and Foreign Corporations That Are Personal Holding Com-
panies, 67 YALE L.J. 1173, 1179-80, 1185-86 (1958). The similar difference between the stock
ownership requirements of §§ 951(a) (2) and 957(a) in subpart F can also be of great prac-
tical importance in special cases. Alexander, supra note 49, at 542.
54. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 551(a). The taxable income of the corporation is first
subject to a limited number of adjustments. INvr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 556.
55. See generally Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5 U. Cm. L. REV.
41, 49-52 (1937).
56. E.g., Tillinghast, supra note 7, at 117.
57. Similarly, tax avoidance by American minority interests is not affected. See Alex-
ander, supra note 53, at 1203.
One of the main types of income subjected to subpart F treatment is foreign personal
holding company income, defined by reference to § 533 but with modifications. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 954(c). For a discussion of the relationship between subpart F and the
personal holding company provisions, see Tillinghast, Problems of the Small or Closely Held




Department has argued that the analogy clearly tends to establish the
constitutionality of subpart F.58 Is the analogy sound? Is it significant?
It is sound if the same principles of constitutional law are applic-
able. Certainly, Eisner v. Macomber and the issues raised by that deci-
sion seem similarly relevant. However, even assuming that prevention
of tax avoidance gives rise to an extension of the taxing power, probably
under the doctrine of constructive receipt, so that stockholders of foreign
personal holding companies may be taxed on the corporate income with-
out severance from capital or realization by completed transaction, there
is some question as to whether subpart F lies within the same extension.
In particular, there is the contention that the situations reached by
subpart F are in no way comparable to the glaring loopholes found and
stopped by Congress in 1937.19 A leading authority had characterized
deferral of tax for foreign subsidiaries as "a sensible accommodation of
our world-wide income rule to the fact that our foreign investments are
subject to taxation at the source.''1° If incorporating an individual's
pocketbook abroad was tax immorality, there had been no such taint
associated with foreign corporations engaged in active business or with
foreign subsidiaries of widely held American corporations.6" The earning
and reinvestment of profits abroad without taxation, it was argued,
could not be evil per se if such operations in less developed countries
were granted the tax deferral.
6 2
Yet the determination of what is avoidance and whom should be
permitted to continue it are surely within the province of Congress, no
matter whose ox may be Gore-d; this is evidenced throughout the entire
Internal Revenue Code. It must simply be clear that Congress was
moving against tax avoidance."8 Here, again, it was in the evolution of
the proposal that fact and form developed to prove congressional intent.
As described more fully before, although the original proposal of the
Treasury Department barred tax deferral indiscriminately except in
less developed countries, congressional modifications increasingly chan-
neled the impact of the legislation against tax haven operations."4 Subpart
F became essentially a tax avoidance remedy, 5 as predicted, 6 and both
58. Hearings on the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations, supra note 9, at 314.
59. Hearings on the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations, sura note 9, at 312; Hear-
ings on H.R. 10650, supra note 38, at 3041.
60. Surrey, supra note 8, at 76.
61. Cf. Tillinghast, supra note 7, at 84-85; H.R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937), 1939-1 Cum. BuLL. (Pt. 2) 722.
62. Hearings on H.R. 10650, supra note 38, at 3013-14.
63. There was testimony that existing § 482 was adequate. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 10650,
supra note 38, at 4816, 4867. Certainly Congress could weigh it and believe otherwise.
64. E.g., Glasmann, supra note 48, at 215-17 (May 31, 1962 draft considered stricter on
tax havens).
65. Wales, Tax Policy in Relation to Foreign Business Income, 40 TAXEs 961, 971-73
(1962).
66. See Anthoine & Bloch, supra note 8, at 351.
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chambers so declared it.67 With evidence of tax avoidance in the record,"8
the intent was justified,69 and the analogy to the foreign personal holding
company provisions appears sound.
7
1
While the analogy may be sound, it is only as significant as the
degree of certainty about the constitutionality of the foreign personal
holding company provisions. One federal circuit court has twice indicated
the validity of taxing minority stockholders when a small American group
holds control. 7' Another has specifically upheld the constitutionality, but
the precise issue was whether the law could be applied when the cur-
rency of the foreign country involved was blocked, and the explanation
of the holding is unsatisfactorily brief considering the novelty of dis-
regarding the corporate entity.7 2 The Supreme Court has cited the 1937
legislation, but only in a footnote to a dictum (possibly a relevant dic-
tum, however) .7 The matter has not progressed much beyond the
original evaluation by Randolph Paul:
67. H.R. REa,. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 1962-3 CuM. BULL. 461-62; S. Rr.
No. -1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 1962-3 Cum. BULL. 784-85.
68. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 10650, supra note 38, at 173-217.
69. A small but prickly issue is whether or not Congress may legislate against avoidance
of taxes levied by other nations. Section 954(b)(4) permits the exclusion of income from
the tainted category if the Internal Revenue Service is satisfied that the choice of country
for organizing the recipient "does not have the effect of substantial reduction of income, war
profits or excess profits taxes or similar taxes." The proposed regulations provided that the
Internal Revenue Service generally would be satisfied if the foreign taxes paid on the income
equal or exceed 90% of the foreign taxes that would have been paid if the corporation had
been organized in the country in which the goods were sold or services performed. Proposed
Treas. Reg. § 1.954-1(b) (3) (i), 27 Fed. Reg. 12760 (1962).
The final regulations do not refer to reduction of foreign taxes, but describe a compari-
son of taxes actually paid "to a country or countries" with the taxes that would have been
paid to the country of destination or production or where the services are performed, as
the case may be. Treas. Reg. § 1.954-1(b)(3)(i),(iii) (1964). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(b)
(1) (i) (b),(ii) (b) (1964) (whether a branch has substantially the same effect as a wholly-
owned subsidiary).
It is true that the use of a foreign corporation to earn foreign income would generally
avoid United States tax. Fisher, Proposed Regulations on Subpart F Income Reflect Cautious
Treasury Approach, 18 J. TAxATION 372, 374 (1963). Yet payment of foreign taxes higher
than American rates certainly tends to show no tax avoidance. Saltzman, Undistributed In-
come Subject to "Taint" of Subpart F is Spelled Out by Final Regulations, 21 J. TAXATION
110, 114 (1964). Nevertheless, the statutory language probably is intended to include savings
of foreign taxes. This brought objections during the hearings. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 10650,
supra note 38, at 2613, 4703, 4756-57. It is believed that Congress may properly consider
avoidance of foreign taxes for the reasons discussed in the conclusion of this paper with
respect to foreign relations.
70. Wales, supra note 65, 961-64. But cf. Sloan, Taxation of American-Controlled For-
eign Earnings Under the Internal Revenue Act Amendments of 1962, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 308,
308-11 (1963). Sloan believes that the legislation can only be explained by a variety of
problems involving three factors: foreign taxpayers, foreign transactions and passive income.
71. American Package Corp. v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1942) ; Alvord v.
Commissioner, 277 F.2d 713, 718-19 (4th Cir. 1960) (dictum).
72. Eder v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1943). No doubt constitutional limita-
tions on taxation are difficult to establish in the midst of a major war.
73. See note 24, supra.
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This method of taxation will no doubt be attacked on constitu-
tional grounds. The broad necessity of saving the revenue will
probably repel any such attack.
7
Thus, though the analogy be sound, the significance is no more than
a probability.
VII. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
[A]ll treaties made . . . under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land.... ."
In line with the quoted provision, the tax law specifically provides for
the exemption of income in any case required by treaty7 and for the
non-applicability of any income tax provision wherever contrary to
any treaty obligation. 7
Income tax treaties to which the United States is a party generally
provide that corporations organized under the laws of the other nation
shall not be subject to United States income tax unless the corporations
have permanent establishments in the United States.7 The Treasury
Department chose to tax the stockholders in order to avoid conflict with
the "permanent establishment" treaty provisions.7 9 Although almost
all treaties also contain a reservation to each nation of the right to tax
its own citizens in any manner,80 critics argue that subpart F is a tax on
the foreign corporation in substance8' and that some treaties have no
reservation and some exempt the income of the foreign corporation rather
than the entity itself.8 2
Some confusion is added to the debate by section 31 of The Revenue
Act of 1962: it states that the amendments made by the Act are not
subject to the provision of the Internal Revenue Code expressing the
supremacy of treaty obligations, but no reference is made to the provision
excluding gross income exempted by treaty." The House clearly intended
that the 1962 legislation prevail,"4 but, in conference, the Senate receded
from its contrary position upon advice of the Treasury Department that
there were no conflicts except with one clause of one treaty and that
74. Paul, supra note 55, at 53.
75. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. (2).
76. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 894.
77. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7852(d).
78. See Hearings on H.R. 10650, supra note 38, at 2631-36; Anthoine & Bloch, supra
note 8, at 350.
. 79. U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, supra note 9, at 12. Another reason was to avoid burdening foreign
minority interests with United States income tax.
80. See authorities cited note 78 supra.
81. Hearings on H-R. 10650, supra note 38, at 3462.
82. Id. at 2391-93. See also the reference to the Convention of the OECD, barring a tax
on the undistributed profits of a company resident in another contracting state, in the separate
views of the Republicans on H.R. 10650. H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 67, at 692-93.
83. 76 Stat. 1069 (1962).
84. H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 67, at 500.
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prompt renegotiation of the exception would be sought.8 5 Whatever con-
flict with existing treaty provisions, if any, is finally found, it would not
apparently result in the invalidity of subpart F as internal law but rather
in a breach of international law."
VIII. CoNcLusIoN
It does seem, from a review of the matter of treaties, that the
Treasury Department rejected the alternative of taxing the foreign
corporation directly in order to minimize international legal complica-
tions. In doing so, its proposal has run head-on into Eisner v. Macomber,
and it is not certain, although it is probable, that this decision can be
overturned, that an exception can be carved in it for tax avoidance reme-
dies, or that subpart F can be related to the commerce power and thus
freed of the requirement of apportionment.
More surely, it would be incongruous for the Court to hold that
Congress must apportion taxes reaching the international activities of
American taxpayers. The taxation of foreign corporations controlled by
Americans is intimately related to the general foreign relations of the
United States, 7 an area in which the federal government traditionally
has plenary power. No doubt the case of some "innocent" minority
investor could accentuate the undesirable, even oppressive, complexity 8
of subpart F, but these are the errors to which Congress is entitled (and
even prone). In this day and age, the responsibilities of the federal
government abroad have exceeded its domestic duties, no matter how
swollen some may believe the latter; reality requires that constitutional
taxing power abroad match those national responsibilities.
The "Innocent" Minority Investor-An Addendum
On March 12, 1965, the Tax Court decided Estate of Nettie S.
Miller. 9 Each of the two taxpayers was a United States citizen with
85. H.R. REP. No. 2508, 87th .Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 1962-3 Culr. BULL. 1176.
86. The applicable rule is that the later congressional action prevails. Beemer, Revenue
Act of 1962 and United States Treaty Obligations, 20 TAx L. REv. 125, 126-31 (1964) ; Hear-
ings on H.R. 10650, supra note 38, at 2360. There is some irrationality in this, since it re-
quires a two-thirds vote of the Senate to ratify a treaty, but only a majority of each house
to enact a tax law. See Sloan, supra note 70, at 348-49. As a hypothetical problem, what if
the tax bill were made law over a presidential veto?
87. Cf. Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax and International Income, 17 TAx L. Rav. 431, 453-61
(1962).
88. It was long ago pointed out that taxing stockholders as partners, when the number
of stockholders can be great, is undesirably complex. See SimoNs, FEDERAL TAX RroaM
75-78 (1950). Add to this the other complexities of subpart F and one may appreciate, if not
join in, the conclusion of Messrs. McDonald, Brudno and Stone that subpart F is so complex
that it will fall of its own weight. Seminar, 5 Sw. L. FN. INST. ON PRv. INv. ABROAD 163-64
(1963).
89. 43 T.C. No. 62. This case exemplifies the complexity caused by minority holdings and
attribution rules in this area. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
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less than five per cent of the outstanding stock of a Canadian holding
company, computed by including in outstanding stock a large block of
warrants held to be the equivalent of stock and owned by two sisters
who were residents and citizens of Canada. If ownership of the warrants
would have been attributed to the brother of the two sisters, a resident
and citizen of the United States," fifty per cent of the stock of the
Canadian corporation would have been owned by five or less citizens
or residents of the United States and it would have been a foreign
personal holding company. The United States brother had been the
broker in the sale to the taxpayers of their stock in the Canadian corpora-
tion.
Judge Mulroney, speaking for the court, reasoned that the foreign
personal holding company provisions are designed to coerce the declara-
tion of dividends and would be ineffective and inequitable if applied to
tax only people who were not part of the actual controlling group.91
It was held that the family attribution rule was intended merely to
reduce the number of United States "actual" owners to five or less, as
when more than five exist because of gifts to children.92
However, as pointed out by Judge Fay in his concurring opinion
(Judges Dawson and Hoyt agreeing), family members could live abroad.
He agreed with the result because the United States brother lacked
"any real economic interest in the holding company" and therefore was
never intended by Congress as the object of the attribution rule. A sepa-
rate concurring opinion of Judge Hoyt (Judges Bruce and Train agree-
ing) would have -also enforced attribution if the United States brother
had actually owned stock himself since there would then be a United
States group to which stock could be attributed.
Of the two dissenting opinions, that of Judge Scott (Judge Atkins
agreeing) was more predictable. He referred to legislative history sup-
porting a literal construction of the attribution rule because minority
stockholders in personal holding companies were unlikely to be strangers,
and he noted that there had been no showing that the particular tax-
payers were unaware of the situation in this case.
Judge Withey's separate dissenting opinion was more relevant to
the constitutional issue. It held that the attribution rule only establishes
a rebuttable presumption of control because "unless this presumption
is a rebuttable one, it would be in some instances in violation of the
due process clause of the United States Constitution." The government
90. The statute in question was § 333(a) (2) of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, now § 554
(a) (2) of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954:
An individual shall be considered as owning the stock owned, directly or indirectly,
by or for his family. . . . [Tlhe family of an individual includes . . . his brothers
and sisters. . ..
91. See note 53 supra.
92. Compare the authorities cited in note 71 supra.
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was deemed to prevail because the taxpayers had failed to overcome the
presumption.
These five opinions in one case confirm the difficulties raised by
the "innocent" minority investor." Judge Withey's opinion shows that
these difficulties may well lead straight to a constitutional problem and
a far-from-unanimous solution.
93. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
